Analysis of flammability in the attached buildings to containment under severe accident conditions  by de la Rosa, J.C. & Fornós, Joan
Nuclear Engineering and Design 308 (2016) 154–169Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Nuclear Engineering and Design
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /nucengdesAnalysis of flammability in the attached buildings to containment under
severe accident conditionshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nucengdes.2016.08.019
0029-5493/ 2016 European Commission Joint Research Centre. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: juan-carlos.de-la-rosa-blul@ec.europa.eu (J.C. de la Rosa),
jfornosh@anacnv.com (J. Fornós).J.C. de la Rosa a,⇑, Joan Fornós b
a European Commission Joint Research Centre, Netherlands
bAsociación Nuclear Ascó-Vandellós, Spain
h i g h l i g h t s
 Analysis of flammability conditions in buildings outside containment.
 Stepwise approach easily applicable for any kind of containment and attached buildings layout.
 Detailed application for real plant conditions has been included.a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 16 March 2016
Received in revised form 16 August 2016
Accepted 19 August 2016
Available online 4 September 2016
JEL classification:
L. Safety and Risk Analysisa b s t r a c t
Right after the events unfolded in Fukushima Daiichi, the European Union countries agreed in subjecting
Nuclear Power Plants to Stress Tests as developed by WENRA and ENSREG organizations. One of the
results as implemented in many European countries derived from such tests consisted of mandatory
technical instructions issued by nuclear regulatory bodies on the analysis of potential risk of flammable
gases in attached buildings to containment.
The current study addresses the key aspects of the analysis of flammable gases leaking to auxiliary
buildings attached to Westinghouse large-dry PWR containment for the specific situation where mitigat-
ing systems to prevent flammable gases to grow up inside containment are available, and containment
integrity is preserved – hence avoiding isolation system failure. It also provides a full practical exercise
where lessons learned derived from the current study – hence limited to the imposed boundary condi-
tions – are applied.
The leakage of gas from the containment to the support buildings is based on separate calculations
using the EPRI-owned Modular Accident Analysis Program, MAAP4.07.
The FATETM code (facility Flow, Aerosol, Thermal, and Explosion) was used to model the transport and
distribution of leaked flammable gas (H2 and CO) in the penetration buildings. FATEmodels the significant
mixing (dilution) which occurs as the released buoyant gas rises and entrains air. Also, FATE accounts for
the condensation of steam on room surfaces, an effect which acts to concentrate flammable gas.
The results of the analysis show that during a severe accident, flammable conditions are unlikely to
occur in compartmentalized buildings such as the one used in the analyzed exercise provided three con-
ditions are met: H2 and CO recombiner devices are found inside the containment; corium is submerged
and cooled down to quenching by flooding the reactor cavity; and the containment remains isolated along
the accident evolution so that gases flowing into attached buildings to containment are limited to the so-
called allowable leakage.
 2016 European Commission Joint Research Centre. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction core-concrete interaction (MCCI), could be released outside con-During a nuclear severe accident with extended core damage
and RPV failure, hydrogen generated in-vessel and ex-vessel,
as well as carbon monoxide generated through moltentainment whether because of containment failure, bypass or
so-called allowable leakage, i.e. very low gas flowrates below
specified values gathered under licensing documents such
Technical Specifications or associated bases.
The present analysis addresses the potential flammability risk
associated with allowable leakages from containment into
attached buildings through the following steps:
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MAAP 4.0.7 code simulations.
2. Identification of all potential receiver locations associated with
singular flow paths such as mechanical penetrations.
3. Modeling of the attached buildings to containment models
using the FATE computer code to represent and analyze the
transport and distribution of the incoming gases.
The FATE results are interpreted by comparing the evolving
hydrogen and carbon monoxide concentrations against the Lower
Flammability Limit (LFL) in air, which is calculated by means of Le
Chatelier’s mixing rule and the pure hydrogen and carbon monox-
ide LFL values of 4% and 12%, respectively.
Section 2 analyzes the severe accident sequence types poten-
tially leading to gas leakages into buildings attached to contain-
ment. Section 3 analyzes leakage locations and types, supported
by the conclusions derived from dedicated experimental research
survey on penetration failures. Section 4 presents the FATE build-
ing model data in terms of nodes, junctions and junction types.
Sections 5 and 6 identify the analyzed cases and present the
results respectively. Section 7 sets forth the main transport mech-
anisms of low-density clouds traveling through attached buildings
to containment upon the analysis of the obtained results sub-
jected to the imposed conditions under the current study. Sec-
tion 8 gathers the main conclusions of the analysis. Finally,
Appendix A provides details on identifying the worst leakage acci-
dent sequence for hydrogen and carbon monoxide generation.2. Selection of severe accident sequence
2.1. Classification of scenarios based upon release interface
Release paths to buildings attached to PWR containment com-
prise the following types of scenario: Interfacing System Loss of
Coolant Accident (ISLOCA) and direct gas flow migration due to
containment loss of integrity as a result of whether isolation sys-
tem failure, containment failure, penetration failure or so-called
allowable leakage.
Depending on plant-specific features, ISLOCA might be chal-
lenging because of flammable gases leaking at high rates. In order
to identify whether ISLOCA should be considered as a bounding
case for flammable gas risk analysis in buildings attached to con-
tainment, it is crucial to identify the probability for the auxiliary
building to withstand the mechanical loads transmitted to the
structure as a consequence of large water masses coming out of
the vessel rapidly flashing to steam. In case of large pipe breaks,
i.e. large ISLOCA, it is hardly that auxiliary building pressure does
not go beyond the ultimate pressure capacity; in case of small
ISLOCA, the probability for the auxiliary building to withstand the
primary system discharge is not negligible so that ISLOCA should
be considered within the set of scenarios. In the current work,
ISLOCA has been neglected as a consequence of Level 2 PRA Mini-
mal Cut Set analysis of results providing evidence that ISLOCA
was driven by the failure of relatively very large size pipes featuring
10-inch diameterminimumsize, causing the pressure in the down-
stream (receiving) building to rapidly increase and exceed the
structural integrity threshold, thereby undergoing gross structural
failure so that the resulting failed auxiliary building would pre-
clude any subsequent accumulation of flammable gas.11 ISLOCA scenario assumed in US NRC SOARCA analysis (States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 2013) considers a 7.1400 break though limited to 2.5700 as a consequence
of an existing Venturi duct flow restriction between the RCS and break thus
significantly limiting the break flow. This is the reason why consequences on the
magnitude of flowrates migrating into auxiliary buildings can substantially differ
from the ones depicted in the current exercise.In the present assessment, leakage as a consequence of con-
tainment system failure through piping systems directly con-
nected to the containment or to the reactor coolant system
(RCS) has been ruled out because of probabilistic-related argu-
ments. The possibility of posing a flammable risk in the attached
buildings was concluded to be unlikely due to the large number
of physical barriers, including isolation valves – either check or
closed position – and remaining high pressure coolant, which will
restrict the flow of gas traveling through such systems.
Containment mechanical failure will also be neglected since
Stress Tests allow utilities crediting for containment pressure
relief devices as backfitting measure. Since the current study –
as described in following Section 2.2 – assumes containment fil-
tered venting availability, containment integrity as jeopardized
by overpressure scenarios is discarded. Containment loss of integ-
rity due to MCCI will also be neglected since success in quenching
the corium before total basemat melt-through as a consequence of
flooding the reactor cavity has also been taken into account.
The decision on whether considering leakages to attached
buildings to containment through penetration failures has been
taken from the results and conclusions of existing extensive
experimental survey carried out during the last thirty years (see
Section 3.1.1).
Therefore, the current approach to analyze the flammability of
gaseous leakage into attached buildings to containment will focus
on and limited to allowable leakages under severe accident condi-
tions. So-called allowable leakage is usually found within the
Technical Specifications report or associated bases of a Nuclear
Power Plant collection of licensing documents, and it is defined
as a flowrate calculated for a maximum percentage of contain-
ment atmosphere volume leaked during a 24-h test period at cer-
tain containment pressure conditions.
2.2. Main assumptions on mitigating systems availability
In order to prevent selecting the worst possible severe accident
scenario ever, risk criterion will be taken into account in terms of
mitigating systems availability. Therefore, any kind of mitigating
systems, fixed or portable, dedicated or alternative, whose opera-
tion is foreseen within severe accident management with high
degree of performance reliability, may be taken into account. This
assumption goes in line with the regulatory technical instructions
issued after the Stress Tests which give utilities the possibility of
crediting for such backfitting measures undertaken as a conse-
quence of the Stress Tests.
The following mitigating systems are hence assumed to be
available:
 Reactor cavity flooding (RCF): In-Vessel Melt Retention (IVMR)
by ex-vessel cooling is not credited due to the high associated
uncertainties. Nevertheless, cavity flooding may lead to
quenching the corium in the reactor cavity and limiting MCCI
following reactor pressure vessel failure. Rapid hydrogen gen-
eration may result when molten corium falls into the flooded
reactor cavity.
 Passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs): PARs remove hydro-
gen at slow rates on the order of grams per second (0.001 kg/s)
as long as oxygen is not depleted in the containment. Hence,
PARs are not effective at mitigating the rapid hydrogen gener-
ation rate during fuel clad oxidation, which ranges between 0.5
and 1 kg/s (even 3 kg/s according to (Jiménez García, 2007)).
Hydrogen generation during core reflooding can be as high as
5–10 kg/s provided the core geometry remains intact.
 Containment filtered venting (CFV): The correct performance
of this passive system prevents catastrophic containment fail-
ure including liner tearing leakages.
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Nuclear Power Plant core damage is qualitatively defined by
ASME and ANS (Esmaili et al., 2010) as the ‘‘uncovery and heat-
up of the reactor core to the point at which prolonged oxidation
and severe fuel damage are anticipated and involving enough of the
core, if released, to result in offsite public health effects”. In the
course of a severe accident, this prolonged oxidation will lead to
hydrogen generation sufficient to achieve a potential risk in terms
of peak pressure and hydrogen combustion.
Unlike Design Basis Accidents (DBA) where thermal–hydraulic
conditions and safety system performance are well defined
through a set of accident sequences usually contained within
the Final Safety Analysis Report or other licensing-related manda-
tory document, sequences falling under the severe accident (SA)
category leading up to and/or going beyond core damage do not
meet a set of predetermined conditions.
In order to identify the severe accident sequence leading to
bounding yet risk-significant flammable gas flowrates leaking to
buildings attached to containment, the following considerations
will be taken into consideration:
1. The initiating event must be a loss of external and internal AC
power, namely a Station Blackout. If the auxiliary building
HVAC system were otherwise available, the inlet and outlet
openings, together with their ventilation devices, would con-
nect the building internal environment with the external
atmosphere.2 Moreover, as ventilation fans are usually located
at the highest building elevation, buoyant flammable gas from
containment would directly be sucked into the ventilation sys-
tem and released outside the structure, preventing flammable
gas accumulation inside the buildings.
2. If allowable leakage is considered, gas flow rate leaving the
containment will range in the order of grams per second. Upon
mixing with entrained air (as the buoyant plume rises before
accumulating at higher elevations) the temperature of the
lighter, potentially flammable layer will turn to be cool enough
to condense nearly the entire steam quantity dragged in the
leaked flow.
3. Leaked gas flowrate increases with containment pressure
which mainly depends on the mass of steam deposited into
the containment atmosphere. On the contrary, higher steam
contents mean lower hydrogen and carbon monoxide concen-
trations. However, since steam released through the leak will
mostly condense on the auxiliary building ceiling and walls,
maximization of the containment pressure will ultimately lead
to higher flammable gases concentrations in the buildings
attached to containment.
4. Once the gas travels into the auxiliary building, it will lose its
momentum and rise like a plume, being buoyancy-driven by
differences both in molar density and temperature with
respect to the auxiliary building air. Throughout the upwards
trajectory, the lighter gas plume will entrain huge quantities
of air, diluting hydrogen and carbon monoxide and preventing
the mixture from reaching flammable conditions before the
leakage point is submerged by the light cloud.
Table 1 summarizes the SBO sequence matrix to be considered.
Selected sequences are simulated using the MAAP 4.07 code
(Fauske and LLC., 2010) to predict hydrogen and carbon monoxide
evolution in the containment and to determine the leakage rate.2 This assumption is at least valid for the plant considered in the current exercise.
Further, no LOCA+SBO as initiating event has been considered due to its associated
low-frequency risk.The selected plant is a generic large dry-containment, 3000 MW
(thermal), 3-loop, Westinghouse PWR. The final sequence has
been selected following the methodology described in Appendix
A. The bounding leakage scenario, MX_SBO_401, assumes failure
of all active safety systems including the turbine-driven emer-
gency feedwater pump, LOCA through the Main Coolant Pump
seals, and hot leg creep rupture.
Uncertainty propagation of key code parameters has not been
taken into account. Appropriate fitting of key code parameters
has been limited to FCHF and FCRDR values as collected in Table 2.
FCHF, a ‘‘Kutateladze number” multiplier to the flat plate crit-
ical heat flux, is the controlling input parameter for molten debris
heat transfer to water following vessel failure. Code parameter
FCRDR is the fraction of the original core mass below which the
remaining core is dumped into the lower head plenum. A value
of 0.5 is applied to make sure that all the core material is relocated
to the cavity to maximize ex-vessel hydrogen generation rate.
In order to realistically adjust the FCHF value, the CCI series of
tests have been analyzed. The CCI series of tests conducted at
Argonne National Laboratories (Farmer et al., 2006) are the most
modern experiments applicable to reactor cavity geometry. The
CCI tests involved sustained interaction of core debris in a 50 cm
x 50 cm square geometry with water addition. The initial core
debris simulant depth was 25 cm. The experimental data support
a minimum long term heat flux of 250 to 300 kW/m2, and typical
values near 500 kW/m2. In summary, a long-term heat flux
between 250 and 500 kW/m2 will be used in the current evalua-
tion. On the other hand, in Nagashima et al. (2012) it is stated
that: ‘‘the value of FCHF should be varied from 0.0036
(40,000 W/m2) to 0.1 (1,000,000 W/m2)”. Therefore, considering
the range of corium to water heat fluxes, the values of FCHF
should be calculated as follows:
0:0036þ ð0:1 0:0036Þ=ð1000-40Þ  ð250 40Þ ¼ 0:0247 ð1Þ
0:0036þ ð0:1 0:0036Þ=ð1000-40Þ  ð500 40Þ ¼ 0:0498 ð2Þ
These values have been calculated, as indicated in Paik et al.
(2010), to match the results of more sophisticated MCCI codes
such as CORQUENCH 3.200. A final value of FCHF = 0.025 is assumed
in the current calculation for conservative purposes.
Moreover, the FCHF selected value is appropriate for Limestone
Common Sand concrete, which is the type of corium assumed in
the plant exercise, which releases large amount of offgas and
hence produces a significant melt eruption cooling. In comparison
basaltic concrete produces very little offgas during MCCI, making
it difficult for water to penetrate into the corium and cool it down.
2.4. MAAP results – bounding hydrogen leakage to attached buildings
Predicted leakage sources (species flow rates) used in each anal-
ysis are illustrated in Fig. 1. The hydrogen rate increases sooner
than the carbon monoxide rate due to the timing of core melt pro-
gression and subsequent core-concrete attack. It is evident that the
leaked gas presents high steam content (steam inerted) yet has the
potential to become flammable when the steam condenses onto
concrete surfaces and other heat sinks. Hydrogen and carbon
monoxide leakage rates decrease gradually over time as PARs
remove those species from the containment atmosphere.3. Analysis of leakage mode
3.1. Penetration seal failures
As long as the containment isolation system performs well, the
maximum leakage will be limited to the allowable (normal) leak-
Table 1
Significant SA sequences for flammability analysis outside containment.
Case Expected phenomena Cont. peak
pressure
[kg/cm2]
Cont. peak
temperature
[K]
RCS pressure at
vessel failure
[kg/cm2]
Vessel
failure
[s]
Between 649 C at CET
and vessel failure
[h]
H2 generated
in-vessel
[kg]
MX_SBO_401 Hot Leg Induced Rupture (HLIR) & LOCA
through the Main Coolant Pump seals
5.6 429 4.2 17,828 3.0 347 (38.8%)
MX_SBO_402 Steam Generator Induced Tube Rupture 5.6 436 144.8 12,188 1.4 331 (37.0%)
MX_SBO_403 Manual Despressurization 5.6 478 19.6 15,584 2.4 259 (28.9%)
MX_SBO_404 Imposed inhibition of HLIR 5.8 457 167.5 12,033 1.4 331 (37.0%)
Table 2
Modified MAAP model parameters in the practical exercise.
Parameter Default value Selected value
FCHF 0.1 0.025
FCRDR 0.1 0.5
J.C. de la Rosa, J. Fornós / Nuclear Engineering and Design 308 (2016) 154–169 157age, La, which for the current exercise has been taken as 0.2% of
the whole containment atmosphere during 24 h at 3.27 kg/cm2
containment pressure.
Containment isolation success is based on penetrations capac-
ity to withstand severe accident pressure and temperature loads.
Main sources of information come from plant equipment surviv-
ability analysis and related test reports, which provides the max-
imum experimental values undergone by the component during a
certain period of time. Additional references may be used as long
as they meet the following requirements:
 The referred material matches the actual one.
 If dealing with a seal, the design must also correspond to real-
ity since according to experimental analysis, temperature
thresholds for different types of seals can range close to the
bounding temperatures obtained in the severe accident
sequence simulations.
 If during an experimental test, temperatures and pressures
have been applied during a significant period of time, typical
of a severe accident.
 Radiation and thermal aging (as these components are passive)
has been conveniently taken into account.
 Maintenance activities performed in plant gives enough confi-
dence to assume that, aside from radiation and thermal aging,
the component has not undergone additional degradation phe-
nomena, like corrosion.
Usual materials used to simulate the appropriate pressure and
temperature conditions are steam and nitrogen. Because of the
intrinsic potential risk of hydrogen, experimental analyzes are
not performed with this gas. Some kind of lower restrictions could
be expected because of its higher reactive nature compared to
nitrogen or steam.
3.1.1. Survey of severe accident research on penetration failure
Since the TMI accident, significant efforts have addressed
potential gaps in different safety areas under the typical condi-
tions of a severe accident. Some of these efforts were related to
the containment integrity, not only focusing on mechanical ulti-
mate failures and liner tearing, but also on the different and very
specific penetrations (Hessheimer and Dameron, 2006).
Containment penetrations can be classified into the following
groups:
 Mechanical penetrations.
 Electrical penetrations. Emergency hatch.
 Personnel hatch.
 Equipment hatch.
All of these types of penetrations can undergo the following fail-
ure modes:
 Loss of penetration integrity caused by a break. All aforemen-
tioned types are subjected to this failure mode.
 Gap formation caused by relative deformations between struc-
tural components. Only mechanical penetrations and hatches
are subjected to this failure mode.
 Degradation process of a seal or a gasket caused by harsh envi-
ronmental conditions, mainly high temperatures. Only hatches
and electrical penetrations are subjected to this failure mode.
The first two modes of failure might be avoided by adjusting
the containment pressure opening setpoints of the CFV to avoid
potential risks related to high pressure loads on penetrations com-
ponents. Looking at the results of the severe accident experimen-
tal programs addressing integrity of containment penetrations
(see indicated references below in this section), the seals and gas-
kets capacity to withstand high temperature conditions seems to
be the most critical issue to tackle in terms of a penetration
failure.
One of the most comprehensive experimental program in this
respect has been carried out by SANDIA national laboratories
together with the US NRC. The main conclusions are briefly
reported hereafter, listed upon the type of containment
penetration:
 Emergency and personnel hatches (Hessheimer and Dameron,
2006; Bridges, 1987; Brinson and Graves, 1988): the experi-
mental seal material is EPDM. This material has been tested
several times with several configurations and the temperature
limits for leakage to commence range over 570 F. In the SAN-
DIA/CBI personnel airlock testing, a real full-scale airlock
assembly sealed with EPDM (E603) was subjected to environ-
mental conditions corresponding to severe accident. In partic-
ular, test 2C consisted of three thermal and pressure cycles.
During the second cycle, the air temperature was raised to
more than 700 F. Then pressure was increased to 300 psig dur-
ing the second pressure load and a temperature decrease was
observed apparently explained as some air was exiting to the
header (not through the seal). There was no measurable leak-
age of the inner door seal. During the third phase the temper-
ature was recovered and when pressure started to increase
again, then a leakage suddenly commenced. According to the
test conclusions, the EPDM threshold temperature for starting
degraded conditions is 600 K, almost matching with the Pres-
ray’s EPDM (E603) seal material temperature limit for degrada-
tion (Brinson and Graves, 1988). SAMG’s Technical Basis Report
(Lewis, 2012) refers to the same experimental analysis, and in a
Fig. 1. MAAP 4.0.7 leakage flow rates.
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and Dameron, 2006) gathering the main experimental activi-
ties performed in their laboratories during the last twenty
years, these tests are also reviewed. Nonetheless, pressure
and temperature unanticipated evolutions during the second
phase of 2C and the leakage detected even if through a location
different than the seals, yield reasonable doubts on the conclu-Fig. 2. Auxiliary building model in FATE code.sions. These reasons, together with a non-well-established
temperature threshold for the entire experimental programs
addressing the containment integrity, make difficult to achieve
a confident and common conclusions. Therefore, as long as new
evidence does not come from experimental analysis or indus-
try, deterministic judgment should be imposed specifying
whether seals and gaskets withstand the temperature loads
typical from severe accidents.
 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) penetrations (Clauss,
1989; Hessheimer and Dameron, 2006): EPAs considered in
the practical application have a Conax design. A Conax EPA
was tested under severe accident conditions simulated with
steam at temperatures and pressures up to 700 F and 135 psia.
The EPA was first radiated and then thermally aged. The struc-
tural and leak integrity was maintained during the entire 10-
day period of the test. Although the inside containment module
seals failed, those in contact with the external surface were
subject to temperatures of less than 340 F. At this temperature
the seal materials are within the serviceability limits, which is
the primary reason why the leak integrity of the EPA was main-
tained. The polysulfone seal inner temperature at the time of
the pressure increase in the module seal pressure (the chamber
between the first and second seal) was believed to be between
485 F and 565 F.
 The equipment hatch is not an issue in our application because
it communicates directly with the atmosphere and not with a
building attached to containment.
The mechanical penetrations do not include any kind of seals
or gasket materials. Therefore, they can resist harsh environmen-
tal conditions. The only exception is the fuel transfer tube pene-
tration, as it presents a series of bellows whose integrity can be
affected not by the temperature but by the pressure loads because
of severe deformations. Experimental analysis conducted at SAN-
DIA national laboratories (Lambert and Parks, 1994) conclude that
the only potential problem for the bellows to withstand the
mechanical deformations are related to corroded bellows not
being leak-tight before loading, which exhibited an increasing
leak rate during loading that depended on the corroded condition.
For the entire set of MAAP simulations indicated in Table 1 and
crediting mitigating systems performance (RCF, CFV, and PARs),
the maximum achieved temperatures are located well below the
threshold values indicated above, where MAAP key model param-
eter FCHF has been coherently adjusted to 0.025. Let us note that if
RCF were not available, temperatures could go beyond the limit-
ing temperature of 600 K for EPDMmaterials which are frequently
used in containment emergency and personnel hatches.
3.2. Leakage locations
3.2.1. Preliminary considerations
According to the maximum acceptable leakage for large dry-
containment with Westinghouse-like Technical Specifications
related to the containment isolation system, which in turn relates
to the type of qualification test to be applied, two different values
are usually found: Type A related to Integrated Leakage Rate Test
(ILRT), and Type B related to Local Leakage Rate Test (LLRT). Type
A measures the combined, non-located specific allowable maxi-
mum leakage under certain conditions of pressure and time. This
rate should be limited to La as a percentage of the containment
atmosphere mass released during a certain period of time, usually
24 h. While Type A applies to mechanical penetrations, Type B
applies to EPAs, emergency, personnel and equipment hatches.
Type B tests identify specific leakages by means of a standard pro-
cedure in terms of pressure and time, usually assigning a maxi-
mum leakage that is a percentage of La.
Fig. 3. Nodalization diagram for buildings attached to the containment.
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accident conditions, so that anticipated penetration failures are
not likely to occur, the containment isolation system meets its
safety criteria and the leakage will be limited to that indicated
in the Technical Specifications or in the Final Safety Analysis
Report document.
Regarding the gaseous mixture velocity, the velocity of a gas
flowing through an orifice or an equipment leak could be calcu-
lated with the choked flow regime equation, given that the
upstream, containment pressure will be higher than 2 bars:
ug ¼ C
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
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ZRT1
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k 1
 
P2
P1
 2=k
 P2
P1
 ðkþ1Þ=k" #vuut ð3ÞAs stated above, the containment temperature does not jeopar-
dize the penetrations integrity so that the leakage rate calculation
will be assumed as the maximum allowable leakage according to
the Technical Specifications:
 The specified value is 0.6 times La for those penetrations sub-
jected to tests B or C: the mechanical penetrations isolation
valves, i.e., inside ducts leakages for type C tests, and the fuel
transfer tube penetration, EPAs, personnel, emergency and
equipment hatches for type B tests.
 The specified value is La for the mechanical penetrations (with
the exception of the fuel transfer tube penetration) and what-
ever non-specified, non-local leakage might occur through the
containment surface.
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considering a cross-sectional area initially specified by the user in
the plant model and calculated from La, yielding a value of
5.2  103 kg/s according to its definition and assuming a typical
containment volume of 60,000 m3 and an air density of
3.76 kg/m3 for the test conditions, and Eq. (3), where 0.72 has
been taken as the discharge coefficient.
3.2.2. Types of leakage points
Two types of leakage locations to attached buildings to con-
tainment where the gaseous mixture can flow through will be
analyzed: existing pinholes distributed throughout the contain-
ment liner and concrete wall (non-localized or non-specific
leakage), and penetration gaps such weld discontinuities or
micro-orifices in the organic seals and gaskets (localized leakage).
 EPAs and both hatches can undergo leakage trough the joint
materials;
 Mechanical penetrations integrity depends on the continuity
through the metallic, welded unions between the sleeve, on
the one hand, and the pipe and the containment liner, on the
other hand, whose connections are met with two closure
heads, each of them located at one side of the sleeve.
Regarding non-specifically located pinholes throughout the
containment liner and wall, the entire containment interfacing
area will be subject to some of these leakage points. However,
they would likely be located at particular discontinuities along
the liner like welding points, changing slopes, etc.
Credible leakage can be distributed (over many pinholes or
penetrations) or localized (such as at a single penetration).
Depending on the leakage location(s), some leakage may go
directly to the atmosphere rather than entering into adjacent
buildings. Distributed leakage is considered more realistic, with
each attached building receiving a portion of the leakage. Local-
ized leakage is considered a limiting (sensitivity) case, in which
all leakage is assumed to exit at a particular penetration. Within
a receiving room in an attached building, the elevation where
the leakage enters will determine how much air can be entrained
as the leaked gas rises to the ceiling. It is conservative to assume
that leakage enters at the top of a receiving room so as to limit the
vertical distance over which air entrainment can occur.
The leakage can therefore be spatially confined to the penetra-
tion locations or be distributed among the different existing pin-
holes throughout the containment liner and wall. In fact, results
coming from ILRTs performed in several large dry-containment
Westinghouse-like NPPs, demonstrate that the majority of the
leakage is being released through unknown, non-localized paths.
The question remains as to where exactly these pinholes are
expected to be located, as well as the number of existing pinholes
leading to the different buildings attached to containment.
As indicated in Section 1, potential leakage inside ducts or
pipes is not analyzed within the scope of this application. This
path is considered unlikely as a result of a series of physical bar-
riers such as liquid preventing the transport of gas and the pres-
ence of closed valves in the flow path. Therefore, potential leak
paths through pipes would likely lead to lower flowrates than
those taken into consideration.4. Building model using the FATETM code
A building model is developed to simulate the gaseous mixture
transport and accumulation. The scope, complexity, and focus of
the building model depend on the strength of the leakage source
and the relative openness of the building structure.The FATETM code (Plys et al., 2005) is used to model the trans-
port and distribution of flammable gas (H2 and CO) in the auxiliary
buildings attached to containment. FATE models the significant
mixing (dilution) which occurs as the released buoyant gas rises
and entrains air. Also, FATE accounts for the condensation of
steam on room surfaces, an effect which acts to concentrate flam-
mable gas.
The building model must include heat sinks to represent the
concrete ceiling, floor and walls where steam condenses increas-
ing the hydrogen concentration in the remaining gas mixture.
The capacity of a heat sink to absorb heat and condense steam
decreases over time as the heat sink heats up. Normally, concrete
walls are sufficiently thick for the thermal wave not to cross the
entire thickness during the timeframe of the analysis. Therefore,
walls are modeled as one-sided heat sinks, with adiabatic bound-
ary condition on the other side. The plant specific concrete ther-
mal properties (density, specific heat, and thermal conductivity)
are input into the model. Conduction inside the concrete wall is
considered. Natural convection and condensation on the heat sink
surfaces are considered.
Containment leakage modeling should comprise multiple
release locations (upon arguments stated above on ILRT results).
Unless the transport paths and affected areas overlap, multiple
leakage points can each be simulated using one source (i.e. one
source room) at a time. However, if the transport paths and
affected areas overlap, then the multiple sources need to be sim-
ulated simultaneously. FATE is able to cope with multiple sources
in one single simulation.
Another approach is to model the bounding case collapsing the
total leakage rate applied in a room. This approach would produce
the most conservative result because it will bound any overlaps in
transport paths and affected areas of individual sources, minimiz-
ing the air dilution process throughout its path.
For slow release scenarios, the actual leakage area from the
attached buildings to the environment (as a result of inlet leakage
flow balance from the containment) is not relevant as long as the
leakage area is sufficiently large to prevent auxiliary building
pressurization. Similarly, sufficient flow area between adjacent
unaffected areas and the source room is assumed so that ‘‘replace-
ment” air can flow into the source room as the buoyant hydrogen
mixture leaves the room.
Special attention must be paid to dead-end rooms where
hydrogen and carbon monoxide can migrate, accumulate, and
become more concentrated. The building model must be con-
structed to simulate migration of hydrogen and carbon monoxide
gas to such a room, and track formation of a stratified layer and
condensation of steam.
4.1. Description of the FATE code
The analysis software used here is FATE (Plys et al., 2005),
which is one of several computer codes available to construct
the building model. FATE (facility Flow, Aerosol, Transport and
Explosion) software was developed specifically to evaluate the
behavior of buoyant plumes and the transport of gases and con-
tamination in stratified layers. FATE has the simplicity of a lumped
parameter code, but is suitable for hydrogen transport and distri-
bution analysis because of the two-layer (stratification) model,
which allows the code to track hydrogen stratification in individ-
ual nodes. It also has a plume model to consider air entrainment
as the gas source rises like a plume.
FATE’s phenomenological capabilities include:
 multiple-compartment representation, either well-mixed or
stratified
 generalized chemical species via property correlations
Fig. 4. Layer boundary heights (top) and H2 volume fractions (bottom) on the 5th
floor of the Auxiliary building (Case 1-1).
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 pressure-driven, counter-current, and diffusion gas flows
 transport of gases and aerosols between compartments
 vapor-aerosol equilibrium
 entrainment of aerosol from liquid and deposited particulate
 deposition of aerosols via gravitational sedimentation, impac-
tion, and so on
 combustion, deflagration and detonation
 heat transfer and condensation on structures
 multidimensional heat conduction in structures
 heat and mass transfer between liquid pools and gas space, and
submerged structures
4.1.1. FATE code validation
The FATE code has been validated against the industry-
recognized large scale THAI test HM-2 (Schwarz et al., 2009). A
similar benchmarking effort is underway to consider a large-
scale containment atmosphere mixing experiment HDR test
E11.2, which exhibited an extended period of gas stratification
in the containment.
The THAI test facility (Thermal–hydraulics, Hydrogen, Aero-
sols, Iodine) has been operated since 1998 by Becker Technologies
GmbH in Eschborn, Germany. The insulated cylindrical contain-
ment vessel has a total volume of 60 m3, a height of 9.2 m
(including the bottom sump) and an inner diameter of 3.2 m. In
test HM-2, hydrogen and steam were injected at the 4.8 m eleva-
tion. A distinct stratified layer was observed in the experiment.
Hydrogen concentration was highest and fairly uniform in the
upper head and upper plenum. Very little hydrogen was found
in the lower plenum.The THAI vessel was modeled as a network of eight control vol-
umes, connected by eight flow paths. Comparing FATE results
with experimental data shows the calculated hydrogen concentra-
tion within 1–2% of experimental values over the modeled inter-
val (0–72 min.).
4.2. FATE model for buildings attached to containment
An auxiliary building has been realistically considered together
with the Spent Fuel building, including the transport paths pro-
vided by the building ventilation system. Fig. 2 illustrates the
compartments of the auxiliary building.
The auxiliary building houses almost all mechanical and electri-
cal penetrations coming from the containment. Those mechanical
penetrations that enter the Turbine Penetrations building are
exposed to the atmosphere through an open gap between the con-
tainmentwall and the Turbine Penetrations buildingwall, prevent-
ing any leakage entering that building. The only exception is the
spent fuel transfer channel (FTC) connected to the Spent Fuel build-
ing (SFB), and theemergencypersonnelhatch (EPH)airlockwhich is
housed in an enclosure connected with the outside environment
through a door and which does not contain any safety equipment.
4.2.1. Auxiliary building
 The auxiliary building extends from elevation 91 to a top eleva-
tion of 120.7. It hosts a total of 67 mechanical penetrations and
75 electrical penetrations in different compartments located at
different closed floors at elevations 91, 100, 108, and 114.5.
 The building can be conceptually divided into two different
vertical blocks, the first one attached along the containment
wall and acting as a kind of penetration building, and the sec-
ond one constituted by a large number of small enclosures
where the different NPP system components are hosted; these
rooms are nearly fully isolated from rooms in the first ‘‘pene-
trations” block.
 Within each of these two blocks some of the rooms are hori-
zontally interconnected through walk-through openings or
above-door ventilation grids.
 There is no direct communication between floors except for
two pairs of compartments belonging to the ‘‘penetrations
block” that are located at elevations 96 and 100. These are only
separated by a metallic mesh floor. There is also a fifth com-
partment located at elevation 100 whose ceiling opens directly
to elevation 108.
 The only vertical communication between compartments,
apart from the paths described above, consists of the ventila-
tion piping network.
 The ventilation system can be simplified and divided into three
independent vertical ‘‘trunk” lines, two of them located along
each side of the penetrations compartments block, and the
third located in the back block of compartments hosting the
system components.
 Each of these three ventilation networks consists of one trunk
traveling through the entire auxiliary building height with
branches and openings in all the associated compartments.
One of these networks connects the back block of compart-
ments, comprising all the enclosures not attached to the con-
tainment wall, while each of the two other networks
accommodate half of the penetrations compartments block.
 On the top floor, elevation 114.5, the three networks are
interconnected.
 There are as many different flow paths as existing compart-
ments, given the relatively closed configuration of the building.
 Wherever a penetration occurs, the possible leakage flow path
will always follow the same pattern: once deposited onto a
Table 3
Case 0-1: realistic distributed release through pinholes; locations are 5% below room
ceilings.
Building Compartment Elevation (abs.; rel.) [m] Leakage [% of La]
Aux. Build. M-2-14L 107.11; 11.11 1.31
Aux. Build. M-2-16L 107.11; 11.11 1.31
Aux. Build. M-3-45 113.49; 13.49 2.02
Aux. Build. M-3-52 107.31; 7.31 0.71
Aux. Build. M-4-15 113.89; 5.89 0.78
Aux. Build. M-4-16 113.89; 5.89 1.64
Aux. Build. M-5-6 120.10; 5.60 1.76
Aux. Build. M-5-7 120.10; 5.60 1.76
Table 4
Case 0-2: realistic distributed release through pinholes; location is 5% below room
ceiling.
Building Compartment Elevation
(abs.; rel.) [m]
Leakage
[% of La]
Spent fuel
building
SFB 132.46; 17.96 1.48
Fig. 5. Layer boundary heights (top) and H2 volume fractions (bottom) on the 4th
floor of the Auxiliary building (Case 1-1).
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After starting to accumulate, in most cases the released gas will
soon be transported to an attached compartment once the
lighter layer thickness reaches the top of the horizontal free
opening between those compartments, thereby increasing the
available ceiling area for condensation. Afterwards the gas will
encounter a ventilation branch opening through which it will
start to move upwards to the top floor and again accumulateat the ceiling. The top compartments close to the containment
wall are interconnected through the ventilation pipes and also
connected with the back compartments block, so the entire
ceiling of the top floor in the Auxiliary building will participate
in the accumulation of the lighter gas layer. Eventually as the
buoyant layer grows in thickness, the lighter gas will move
downward, filling up each floor and flowing to the different
rooms and floors through the ventilation branches and trunks.
 The large ventilation pipes inside which the lighter gas can tra-
vel provide for high steam condensation rates and a relatively
low level of air entrainment as the gas rises to the higher com-
partments. Without air entrainment the lighter gas tends to
maintain its concentration of flammable gases, and with con-
densation of steam the hydrogen and carbon monoxide con-
centrations can potentially increase.
 The building model nodalization is depicted in Fig. 3. In order
to model all the compartments which could potentially receive
leakage from the containment, almost all the rooms of the so
called penetrations block are configured separately. The excep-
tions are compartments M-3-44 and M-3-49, whose metallic
mesh floors allow gas to flow freely from below. These rooms
are combined with M-2-14 and M-2-16, respectively, and des-
ignated as M-2-14L and M-2-16L. The compartments in the
back block have been horizontally lumped into one node per
floor (designated as nodes 1F, 2F, etc.).
4.2.2. Turbine penetrations building
The gap between the containment wall and the Turbine Pene-
trations building wall will prevent any leakage from entering this
building.
4.2.3. Spent fuel building and emergency personnel hatch building
The spent fuel building (SFB) extends from elevation 100 to
131.5 and it can be geometrically simplified as a rectangular prism
of dimensions 23.5 and 37.6 m (883 m2), 18.9 m height. It com-
municates with the containment only through the fuel transfer
tube. The very large building dimensions and significant height
above a possible leakage point (either a single penetration or a
pinhole leakage) should keep flammable gas sufficiently diluted
to become flammable.
In the event that containment leakage occurs through the
emergency personnel hatch organic seals, or through pinholes
located at the containment liner and wall, the leaked gas could
start to accumulate in a relatively isolated enclosure since this
hatch communicates only with a small building at the same time
connected to the outside environment. The emergency airlock is
located at a relatively high elevation in the enclosure, thereby lim-
iting the extent to which flammable gases can be diluted before
they reach the ceiling. Even though this enclosure does not host
any safety equipment, so any potentially flammable gas would
not impact the availability of safety systems, it is still considered
for conservatism since the enclosure is in direct contact with the
containment wall. This compartment is referred to as the emer-
gency personnel hatch building (EPHB) and it is divided into
two nodes (upper and lower, EPHBU and EPHBL, respectively)
according to their different geometrical form. The Spent Fuel
building is modeled as a single large node because it features an
entire open space.5. Analyzed cases
Several cases have been analyzed to account for situations
where containment leakage may be distributed over the entire
containment surface or in a specific location at the highest credi-
ble elevation. Case groups 0 and 1 consider distributed sources,
Table 5
Case 0-3: realistic distributed release through pinholes; location is 5% below room
ceiling.
Building Compartment Elevation (abs.; rel.) [m] Leakage [% of La]
EPHB EPHBU (upper) 106.23; 2.23 0.12
EPHB EPHBL (lower) 103.8; 3.8 0.25
Table 6
Case 1-1: 100% release, 50% through pinholes and 50% through penetration
locations; locations are at the highest penetration in each room.
Building Compartment Elevation (abs.; rel.) [m] Leakage [% of La]
Aux. Build. M-2-14L 106.70; 10.70 11.50
Aux. Build. M-2-16L 106.70; 10.70 11.97
Aux. Build. M-3-45 112.45; 12.45 14.30
Aux. Build. M-3-52 102.35; 2.35 5.94
Aux. Build. M-4-15 112.45; 4.45 11.18
Aux. Build. M-4-16 112.26; 4.26 20.28
Aux. Build. M-5-6 118.80; 4.30 15.12
Aux. Build. M-5-7 118.80; 4.30 9.72
Table 7
Case 1-2: 100% release, 50% through pinholes and 50% through penetration
locations; location is at the highest penetration in the room.
Building Compartment Elevation (abs.; rel.) [m] Leakage [% of La]
Spent fuel
building
SFB 119.50; 5.50 100
Table 8
Case 1-3: 100% release, 50% through pinholes and 50% through penetration
locations; location is at the highest penetration in the room.
Building Compartment Elevation (abs.; rel.) [m] Leakage [%]
EPHB EPHBU 106.11; 2.11 100
Table 9
Cases 2: 100% release, through one (highest) penetration location in each room.
Building Compartment Elevation (abs.; rel.) [m] Leakage [%]
Aux. Build. M-1-21 98.6; 7.6 100
Aux. Build. M-2-14L 106.70; 10.70 100
Aux. Build. M-2-16L 106.70; 10.7 100
Aux. Build. M-3-45 112.45; 12.45 100
Aux. Build. M-3-52 102.35; 2.35 100
Aux. Build. M-4-15 112.45; 4.45 100
Aux. Build. M-5-6 118.80; 4.30 100
Aux. Build. M-5-7 118.80; 4.30 100
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building has been taken proportional to the fraction of the con-
tainment surface touching that building, or ‘‘100%” leakage (Case
group 1), where the entire La is conservatively assigned to that
building, i.e. assuming no leakage is flowing to any other place
throughout the containment surface. Within these two case
groups, separate analyzes have been performed for the auxiliary
building (Cases 0-1 and 1-1, see Tables 3 and 6), for the Spent Fuel
building (Cases 0-2 and 1-2, see Tables 4 and 7), and for the emer-
gency personnel hatch building (Cases 0-3 and 1-3, see Tables 5
and 8). Cases 2 (see Table 9), making a step further in terms of
conservative assumptions, assume all leakage passing through a
single penetration, thus representing a bounding release where
each analysis hence assumes 100% of the leakage (La) through a
single release point.Therefore, cases 1-1 and 1-2 are similar to Cases 0-1 and 0-2
except that 100% of the total gas leakage is assumed to enter into
the affected building (nothing is lost to the outside environment)
and the total allowable leakage La is considered to be released half
through supposed pinholes, i.e. proportional to the relative room
area, and half at containment penetration locations, i.e. propor-
tional to the number of penetrations located in each room. The
split fraction leakage entering into each source room is conserva-
tively located at the highest existing penetration elevation.
Cases 2 assume 100% of the total leakage passing through a sin-
gle point located at the highest penetration location in the source
room.
6. Results
Tables 10-1 and 10-2 summarize the results for the affected
compartments. For all cases, yielding gas concentrations are not
flammable, in most cases quite far from flammable conditions.
Special care is taken regarding case 2-1 where a total concen-
tration value of hydrogen and carbon monoxide amounts slightly
more than 3% (yet lower than the calculated combined LFL),
whose leakage flow rates – when 100% of La is assumed to occur
through a single penetration leakage point – account for the mit-
igating action of containment flooding right after reaching 649 C
at the core exit thermocouples. Given that penetrations through
which gases are leaking to the auxiliary building are located at a
very low elevation (98.6 for the penetration axis), in direct contact
with the recirculation sumps, they will immediately be sub-
merged by the water injected into the containment thus prevent-
ing further leakage.
According to simulations performed with the MAAP4.07 code,
the time for the water to reach the maximum level of the contain-
ment recirculation sumps penetrations (98.9048) is 27,025 s
(7.5 h) from the initiating event. Assuming an elapsed time to per-
form the human action of containment flooding after reaching
649 C at CET of 30 min, the leakage stops after 8 h from the initi-
ating event. This time will be used as a cut off time for the leakage
flow rate.
The Auxiliary building and Spent Fuel building yield values
well below the safety threshold:
 For the distributed leakage cases – Cases groups 0 and 1 the
maximum flammable gas concentration (combined H2 and
CO) is less than 0.3%.
 For the sensitivity cases – Case 2 analyzes – the maximum
flammable gas concentration is less than 3.3%.
The emergency personnel hatch building layout allows hydro-
gen and carbon monoxide to reach higher concentrations only in
the conservative case where 100% of the allowable leakage is
placed in that building, i.e., assuming the entire leakage La passes
through the emergency personnel airlock. The peak flammable gas
concentration is 3.5% (Case 1-3) and the layer thickness reaches
2 m. This compartment has a relatively small cross-sectional area,
so that the source elevation becomes submerged rather quickly in
the hydrogen-bearing layer. Still, the gas concentration is not
flammable and since this enclosure does not host any safety
equipment and directly communicates with the environment,
the situation is not of great concern.
For Case 0-2, where a fraction of the gas leakage is assumed to
enter the spent fuel building (Node 43) close to the ceiling, a
0.76 m thick gas layer of 0.01% H2 develops in the source room
(Node 43). For Case 1-2, where 100% of the total gas leakage is
assumed to enter the spent fuel building (Node 43) at the highest
penetration, a 13.33 m thick gas layer of 0.04% H2 and 0.01% CO
develops in the source room (Node 43).
Table 10-1
Maximum hydrogen and carbon monoxide concentrations and layer thickness in affected areas (1 of 2).
Case Source
Location
M-1-21
Node 1
M-1-22
Node 2
M-2-16L
Node 6
M-3-52
Node 10
M-4-16
Node 11
M-5-6
Node 15
M-5-7
Node 16
M-3-53
Node 17
5F
Node 23
0-1 Distributed – Auxiliary Bldg H2
CO
d
0.09%
0.02%
0.50 m
0.22%
0.04%
0.34 m
0.11%
0.02%
0.22 m
0.14%
0.03%
0.22 m
0.13%
0.03%
0.22 m
0-2 Distributed – Spent Fuel Bldg H2
CO
d
0-3 Distributed – EPH Enclosure Bldg H2
CO
d
1-1 Distributed – Auxiliary Bldg H2
CO
d
0.14%
0.01%
0.83 m
0.11%
0.02%
5.25 m
0.14%
0.03%
1.84 m
0.13%
0.03%
1.50 m
0.12%
0.02%
1.50 m
0.10%
0.02%
0.90 m
0.11%
0.02%
0.65 m
1-2 Distributed – Spent Fuel Bldg H2
CO
d
1-3 Distributed – EPH Enclosure Bldg H2
CO
d
2-1 M-1-21
Node 1
H2
CO
d
2.69%
0.63%
2.64 m
2-2 M-2-14L
Node 25
H2
CO
d
1.11%
0.14%
0.13 m
1.12%
0.13%
0.23 m
1.05%
0.13%
0.08 m
2-3 M-2-16L
Node 6
H2
CO
d
0.60%
0.04%
0.82 m
0.16%
0.04%
0.90 m
0.16%
0.04%
0.21
0.52%
0.03%
0.27 m
0.53%
0.03%
0.28 m
0.17%
0.04%
0.90 m
0.50%
0.04%
0.08 m
2-4 M-3-45
Node 30
H2
CO
d
0.24%
0.05%
0.02 m
0.23%
0.04%
0.02 m
0.05%
0.01%
0.01 m
2-5 M-3-52
Node 10
H2
CO
d
0.63%
0.07%
5.25 m
0.55%
0.07%
0.41 m
0.55%
0.07%
0.45 m
0.52%
0.07%
0.15 m
2-6 M-4-15
Node 31
H2
CO
d
2-7 M-5-6
Node 15
H2
CO
d
0.42%
0.06%
1.49 m
0.38%
0.05%
0.79 m
0.36%
0.05%
0.29 m
2-8 M-5-7
Node 16
H2
CO
d
0.44%
0.07%
0.64 m
0.50%
0.08%
1.50 m
0.43%
0.07%
0.32 m
Table 10-2
Maximum hydrogen and carbon monoxide concentrations and layer thickness in affected areas (2 of 2).
Case Source
Location
Vent_Pen_R
Node 24
M-2-14L
Node 25
M-3-45
Node 30
M-4-15
Node 31
Vent_Pen_L
Node 33
M-2-7
Node 39
EPHBU
Node 41
EPHBL
Node 42
SFB
Node 43
0-1 Distributed – Auxiliary Bldg H2
CO
d
0.09%
0.02%
0.50 m
0.05%
0.01%
0.57 m
0.05%
0.01%
0.97 m
0-2 Distributed – Spent Fuel Bldg H2
CO
d
0.01%
0%
0.76 m
0-3 Distributed – EPH Enclosure Bldg H2
CO
d
0.92%
0.15%
0.04 m
0.23%
0.05%
0.12 m
1-1 Distributed – Auxiliary Bldg H2
CO
d
0.10%
0.01%
1.54 m
0.22%
0.04%
0.88 m
0.13%
0.03%
2.31 m
0.14%
0.03%
3.19 m
0.14%
0.03%
3.19 m
0.10%
0.01%
0.94 m
1-2 Distributed – Spent Fuel Bldg H2
CO
d
0.04%
0.01%
13.33 m
1-3 EPH Enclosure Bldg H2
CO
d
3.45%
0.04%
2.03 m
0.94%
0.20%
0.10 m
2-1 M-1-21
Node 1
H2
CO
d
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Fig. 6. Layer boundary heights (top) and H2 volume fractions (bottom) on the 3rd
floor of the Auxiliary building (Case 1-1).
Table 10-2 (continued)
Case Source
Location
Vent_Pen_R
Node 24
M-2-14L
Node 25
M-3-45
Node 30
M-4-15
Node 31
Vent_Pen_L
Node 33
M-2-7
Node 39
EPHBU
Node 41
EPHBL
Node 42
SFB
Node 43
2-2 M-2-14L
Node 25
H2
CO
d
1.23%
0.14%
0.88 m
1.24%
0.14%
0.35 m
2-3 M-2-16L
Node 6
H2
CO
d
0.60%
0.04%
0.64 m
0.36%
0.06%
0.32 m
2-4 M-3-45
Node 30
H2
CO
d
0.15%
0.03%
0.02 m
0.35%
0.07%
6.89 m
0.35%
0.07%
4.50 m
0.36%
0.07%
11.25 m
2-5 M-3-52
Node 10
H2
CO
d
0.63%
0.07%
0.42 m
0.42%
0.08%
0.29 m
2-6 M-4-15
Node 31
H2
CO
d
0.55%
0.10%
3.16 m
0.54%
0.10%
2.61 m
2-7 M-5-6
Node 15
H2
CO
d
0.42%
0.06%
0.44 m
0.42%
0.06%
0.47 m
2-8 M-5-7
Node 16
H2
CO
d
0.50%
0.08%
0.38 m
0.50%
0.08%
0.37 m
J.C. de la Rosa, J. Fornós / Nuclear Engineering and Design 308 (2016) 154–169 165For illustration, example graphical results showing gas concen-
trations as a function of time for Case 1-1 are presented in Figs. 4–
6 for rooms on the 5th, 4th, and 3rd floors, respectively. At the top
of the Auxiliary building (5th floor) leakage occurs into roomM-5-
6 (Node 15) and room M-5-7 (Node 16). The hydrogen bearing
mixture is distributed to other areas on the 5th floor (Node 23)
through the ventilation system. The H2 volume fraction in M-5-6
(Node 15) is higher than in M-5-7 (Node 16) because the fraction
of release directed to M-5-6, 15.12%, is higher than that directed
to M-5-7, 9.72%. The upper layer on the 5th floor also contains
hydrogen transported from below through the ventilation system.
Note that the buoyant layer boundary does not extend to the floor
of the room.
Fig. 7 shows temperatures for roomM-5-6 and the overall con-
densed steam mass. The concrete ceiling temperature in room M-
5-6 rises by only about 4 C over three days, while 700 kg of steam
are condensed in the entire building.
At the 4th floor of the Auxiliary building (Fig. 5), leakage occurs
into room M-4-15 (Node 31) and room M-4-16 (Node 11). The
hydrogen bearing mixture accumulates near the ceilings of the
source rooms and also enters the ventilation system, through
which the mixture rises to the top floor. The H2 volume fraction
in room M-4-16 (Node 11) is higher than in room M-4-15 (Node
31) because the fraction of release directed to M-4-16, 20.28%, is
higher than that directed to M-4-15, 11.18%. The rest of the 4th
floor (Node 22) is not affected by hydrogen.
At the 3rd floor of the Auxiliary building (Fig. 6) leakage occurs
into room M-3-45 (Node 30) and room M-3-52 (Node 10). The
hydrogen bearing mixture accumulates near the ceilings of the
source rooms and also enters the ventilation system, through
which the mixture rises to the top floor. Room M-3-45 extends
to the 4th floor and is connected to room M-4-15, another source
location on the 4th floor. The H2 volume fraction in M-3-45 is rel-
atively high because the source elevation (112.45 m) is close to
the ceiling (114.20 m) and hence there is little time for air entrain-
ment before the source location is submerged in the buoyant
layer. The rest of the 3rd floor is not affected by hydrogen.
Leakage also occurs in the 2nd floor but not in the 1st loor.
Hydrogen concentrations in each buoyant layer depend on source
hydrogen concentration, source flow rate, and air entrainment
which depend on the source elevation. Dilution by air entrainment
ends when the source location is submerged by the descending
buoyant layer. Usually most of the steam in the buoyant layercondenses on concrete ceilings, increasing the hydrogen concen-
tration in the buoyant layer.7. Behavior of low-density clouds subject to the analyzed
conditions
Once gone through the analyzed cases and subsequent results
carried out in the current exercise, generic statements on main
Fig. 7. Room M-5-6 node temperatures (top) and condensed steam mass (bottom)
on the 5th floor of the Auxiliary building (Case 1-1).
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impact on auxiliary buildings to containment might be drawn. It is
worth emphasizing that such statements are subjected only to
those scenarios assuming the same hypotheses above taken into
account, i.e. hydrogen and CO recombiner devices are found inside
the containment; corium is submerged and cooled down to
quenching by flooding the reactor cavity; and the containment
remains isolated along the accident evolution so that gases flow-
ing into attached buildings to containment are limited to so-
called allowable leakages.
Two main driving mechanisms affect gas flammability charac-
terization once released outside containment: air entrainment
and steam condensation.Fig. 8. Phases of leakage dThe air entrainment rate depends on the interface area
between the plume and the environment and the velocity differ-
ence, which in turn depends on the initial inlet gas velocity
relying on containment pressure and initial inlet gas tempera-
ture. Nonetheless, even though these variables have the poten-
tial to affect how much air is entrained during the upwards
flow path, their influence on flammable gas concentration is
ultimately low and not straightforward: First, and according to
additional sensitivity results performed with the FATE code,
variations within realistic ranges of inlet velocities and temper-
atures result in a very short entrained air range controlled by a
sort of minimum, threshold entrainment, when the velocity is
minimum and the temperature difference is zero: as this value
is high enough to transfer huge amounts of air, the lighter layer
will have the chance to achieve risk concentrations only after
the entrainment effect is zero, i.e., after the source point is cov-
ered by the lighter layer. Second, lower entrainments mean
lower remaining quantities of hydrogen and carbon monoxide
still to be transported outside containment once the source term
is submerged. Third, temperature and velocity affects the
entrainment rate; however, the lower the entrainment rate,
the higher the elapsed time – thus the entrainment process
span – needed to cover the source term point and arrest the
dilution process.
Therefore, and looking at the sensitivity results, flammable
gases peak concentrations are not significantly impacted by vari-
ations in inlet velocity and temperature, which draws the conclu-
sion that entrainment, as reflected in the analyzed cases, is only
mainly affected by the relative elevation between the leakage
point and ultimate reservoir ceiling.
Regarding the influence of steam condensation on flammabil-
ity risk for the type of scenarios analyzed under the current
exercise, and when dealing only with inlet masses ranged in
the order of an allowable leakage flowrate (around 3–5 gr/s),
the concrete heat capacity presented in the auxiliary building
is high enough to remove all the latent heat of vaporization
of the entire steam content in the inlet gas, down to the steam
concentration fixed by its saturation partial pressure at the
environment temperature. Therefore, no significant variations
stemming from steam condensation potentially modifying
flammability risk have been found along the entire set of car-
ried out cases. Rather, all of them show a very similar pattern
wherein flammability cloud steam is entirely being condensed
with time.
According to the low-density cloud behavior observed in the
analyzed cases, the whole transport and build-up process can be
described in four steps (see Fig. 8):eposition evolution.
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mixture of condensable and noncondensable gases whose
average density is significantly lower than air. Once depos-
ited into a particular receiver enclosure outside contain-
ment, it will rapidly lose its momentum and start to
behave like a plume hence rising upwards until reaching
the ceiling of this or another destination compartment.
Along its flow path, the lighter cloud entrains huge quanti-
ties of air by means of which hydrogen and carbon monox-
ide are highly diluted down to far-from-risk threshold
levels close to 4% (see Fig. 9). Minimum dilution ratios
(for a unique leakage point) per length unit for allowable
leakage areas range from 20 to 70 (where this large range
depends on the interface area increase with length in an
entrainment positive feedback process (thus increasing
the total gas volume) as long as the flow path length is
increased).
Once unable to keep rising further up, the lighter mixture of
gases will start depositing and building up onto the destina-
tion compartment ceiling, where new, ongoing lighter
clouds will reach the ceiling roughly at the same flammable
gases concentration. As the amount of entrained air is sig-
nificantly higher than the leakage flow rate, the lighter layer
will go down relatively fast until achieving the source term
elevation and thus submerging the leakage point. Through
the entire phase, flammable gases concentration will shar-
ply decrease from their inlet, initial values.
(2) Concentration phase (Fig. 8B): From that moment on, the
lighter layer will start increasing very slowly according to
low leakage flowrates as the entrained air will be canceled,
and hydrogen and carbon monoxide will start to increase as
long as their inlet concentrations are higher than those
found in the lighter layer at the receiver compartment. At
the same time, and given the large amounts of entrained
air dragged by the light plume, the average temperature
of the gaseous mixture will be close to the average environ-
ment temperatures, and almost all the steam contained in
the inlet gases will be removed by condensation at the con-
crete ceiling and walls down to its steam concentration sat-
uration value at the environment temperature.
(3) Long-term phase (Fig. 8C): Provided PARs availability and
oxygen depletion having not been reached, there will be
an instant when the inlet flammable gases concentration
will be equal to the light density cloud concentration. After-
wards the flammable gases concentration will start to
decrease. According to additional sensitivity runs per-
formed with the MAAP and FATE codes, had been PARs
not available or oxygen depletion had been reached, the
flammable gases concentration would continue increasingFig. 9. Hydrogen and CO concentration evolution in a low-density cloud layer.until the corium internal energy decayed down enough to
set the reactor cavity heat sinks below their melting
temperature.
8. Conclusions
One of the requested issues required by nuclear regulatory
bodies as a consequence of the Stress Tests undertaken by Euro-
pean Nuclear Power Plants consisted of analyzing the potential
risk imposed by flammable gases released to attached buildings
to containment.
The current work provides with a full exercise assuming PARs
continuous availability inside containment, ex-vessel corium
quenching, and success in preserving containment integrity so
that gas flowrates are limited to so-called allowable leakages.
Insights are presented on key aspects governing low-density cloud
behaviors traveling along auxiliary buildings whenever such con-
ditions are met.
The plant design used in the exercise is a generic large dry-
containment Westinghouse PWR with different buildings
attached to containment: auxiliary building, turbine penetrations
building, emergency personnel hatch building and spent fuel
building, each of which featuring an entirely different
configuration.
The source term leakage from the containment to attached
buildings has been calculated by means of severe accident
sequence simulations performed with the MAAP4.07 code
whereas the FATE code was used to model transport and distribu-
tion of leaked flammable gas (H2 and CO) in the penetration build-
ings which have been accurately modeled mimicking real building
layouts. FATE models the significant mixing (dilution) which
occurs as the released buoyant gas rises and entrains air. Also,
FATE accounts for the condensation of steam on room surfaces,
an effect which acts to concentrate flammable gas.
The results of the analysis demonstrate that flammable condi-
tions are unlikely to occur in compartmentalized buildings such as
the one used in the analyzed exercise as long as three conditions
are met: flammable gas recombiners are installed inside the con-
tainment thereby decreasing flammable gases outward flow after
a few days; corium is submerged and cooled down to quenching
by flooding the reactor cavity, thereby imposing a limit to temper-
ature increase and carbon monoxide generation; and containment
isolation is preserved in terms of mechanical failure, containment
bypass to auxiliary buildings, and penetrations withstanding the
large and long sustained thermal loads throughout the accident
thereby limiting flammable gases flowing into auxiliary buildings
to so-called allowable leakages.
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Methodology for identifying the worst leakage accident sequence
1. First step consists of obtaining the gas flow rates for each of
the species of interest presented in the containment compartment
acting as a leakage source: CO2, CO, H2O, N2, O2, and steam. Let us
make use of an example, where depicted variables stand for gas
molar fractions in the upper containment compartment:
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1.56E+04 4.58E04 0.574709 7.79E06 1.82E02 0.328928 7.77E02
1.59E+04 4.81E04 0.575121 8.93E06 1.80E02 0.328804 7.75E02
1.62E+04 4.78E04 0.577155 9.71E06 1.77E02 0.327463 7.72E02
1.65E+04 4.97E04 0.577211 1.14E05 1.75E02 0.327707 7.71E02
1.68E+04 5.18E04 0.580492 1.27E05 1.72E02 0.325353 7.64E02
1.71E+04 5.42E04 0.584626 1.43E05 1.69E02 0.322363 7.56E02
1.74E+04 5.73E04 0.588522 1.59E05 1.66E02 0.319509 7.48E02
1.77E+04 6.02E04 0.592729 1.77E05 1.62E02 0.316428 7.40E02
1.80E+04 6.27E04 0.596237 1.96E05 1.60E02 0.313896 7.33E02
1.83E+04 6.49E04 0.599041 2.17E05 1.57E02 0.311919 7.27E022. The next step consists of canceling the steam contribution to the gas flow rate:TIME [s] NFCORB [] NFSTRB [] NFC2RB [] NFH2RB [] NFN2RB [] NFO2RB []
1.56E+04 4.58E04 0.0 7.79E06 1.82E02 0.328928 7.77E02
1.59E+04 4.81E04 0.0 8.93E06 1.80E02 0.328804 7.75E02
1.62E+04 4.78E04 0.0 9.71E06 1.77E02 0.327463 7.72E02
1.65E+04 4.97E04 0.0 1.14E05 1.75E02 0.327707 7.71E02
1.68E+04 5.18E04 0.0 1.27E05 1.72E02 0.325353 7.64E02
1.71E+04 5.42E04 0.0 1.43E05 1.69E02 0.322363 7.56E02
1.74E+04 5.73E04 0.0 1.59E05 1.66E02 0.319509 7.48E02
1.77E+04 6.02E04 0.0 1.77E05 1.62E02 0.316428 7.40E02
1.80E+04 6.27E04 0.0 1.96E05 1.60E02 0.313896 7.33E02
1.83E+04 6.49E04 0.0 2.17E05 1.57E02 0.311919 7.27E023. The volume previously occupied by the steam is distributed among the rest of the species weighted according to its former molar fraction
making use of the following equation:
vnewi ¼ voldi þ vst  voldi
X6
j¼1
voldj
,
ð1ÞTIME [s] NFCORB [] NFSTRB [] NFC2RB [] NFH2RB [] NFN2RB [] NFO2RB []
1.56E+04 1.08E03 0.00E+00 1.83E05 4.28E02 7.73E01 1.83E01
1.59E+04 1.13E03 0.00E+00 2.10E05 4.25E02 7.74E01 1.83E01
1.62E+04 1.13E03 0.00E+00 2.30E05 4.19E02 7.74E01 1.82E01
1.65E+04 1.17E03 0.00E+00 2.70E05 4.14E02 7.75E01 1.82E01
1.68E+04 1.24E03 0.00E+00 3.03E05 4.10E02 7.76E01 1.82E01
1.71E+04 1.30E03 0.00E+00 3.44E05 4.06E02 7.76E01 1.82E01
1.74E+04 1.39E03 0.00E+00 3.86E05 4.03E02 7.76E01 1.82E01
1.77E+04 1.48E03 0.00E+00 4.36E05 3.99E02 7.77E01 1.82E01
1.80E+04 1.55E03 0.00E+00 4.86E05 3.95E02 7.77E01 1.81E01
1.83E+04 1.62E03 0.00E+00 5.41E05 3.91E02 7.78E01 1.81E014. Next step consists of calculating the lower flammability limit (LFL) at each time according to Le Chatelier’s rule and assuming that 4% and
12.5% are the pure mixture flammability limits for hydrogen and carbon monoxide respectively:
LFLðtÞ ¼ 1vCOðtÞ
ðvCOðtÞþvH2ðtÞÞ=0:125þ
vH2ðtÞ
ðvCOðtÞþvH2ðtÞÞ=0:04
ð2ÞTIME LFL LFL-[H2+CO]1.56E+04 0.040678 3.23E03
1.59E+04 0.040719 2.87E03
1.62E+04 0.040727 2.32E03
1.65E+04 0.040765 1.80E03
1.68E+04 0.040812 1.43E03
1.71E+04 0.040865 1.01E03
1.74E+04 0.040931 7.13E04
1.77E+04 0.040997 3.76E04
1.80E+04 0.041056 1.02E05
1.83E+04 0.04111 3.86E045. The time instant when LFL-[H2 + CO] makes positive sets the maximum time for the integration of hydrogen and carbon monoxide leak
flow rates. The worst leakage generation case is the one which maximizes this value.
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